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We develop  a  new model  that  links  capital  market  imperfection  to  banking  emergence  and 
economic growth. It is shown that the banking system emerges endogenously after a first stage of 
slow economic growth. Interestingly, economic growth increases after the emergence of banking 
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1. Introduction
This  paper  investigates  the  relationship  between  banking  and  growth  in  the  presence  of  an 
inefficient judicial system. With regards to banks, the legal framework is particularly important. 
For  example,  in  case  of  borrower's  default  the  bank  often  has  the  right  to  seize  collateral. 
However,  in  practice  the  enforcement  of  this  right  depends on the  efficiency of  the judicial 
system. A number of empirical studies (Stulz, 2001; Levine, 1998 and Beck et al., 2001) have 
shown that the legal framework is crucial for the development of a financial system. Figure 1 
shows two financial depth indicators (Private Credit/GDP and Liquid liability/GDP) in the period 
2000-04 versus the judicial efficiency (JE) for 76 countries  1 divided in quartiles according to 
their "level" of judicial efficiency.  It is clear that the two indicators of financial development 
increase with the judicial efficiency. This positive relationship suggests that the emergence of a 
banking system at the early stage of economic development may be influenced by the level of 
judicial efficiency. 
The existence of a banking system is expected to lead to higher economic growth by providing 
more finance for productive projects.  However,  the judicial  efficiency may in turn affect the 
intensity  of  this  positive  relationship.  That  is,  when the  judicial  system is  weak,  banks will 
finance  only  those  entrepreneurs  providing  sufficient  collateral.  Figure  2  outlines  the 
entrepreneurship  density  in  the  period between 2002-04 versus  the judicial  efficiency for  56 
countries 2.  The solid curve traces the regression line which has a positive and highly significant 
coefficient  (t-statistic,  5.18) and an  R2 of 0.20.  An increase of the judicial  efficiency of 1 is 
associated,  on  average,  with  18.83  percent  increase  in  the  entrepreneurship  density.  This  is 
a large quantitative effect which suggests that even if a banking system has already emerged, an 
economy may suffer from low entrepreneurship due to the weakness of its judicial system. 
Motivated by these empirical  facts this paper proposes a theoretical model that focuses on two 
issues. First, the model seeks to provide a new explanation of the emergence of banking based on 
capital accumulation and credit market imperfection (judicial inefficiency).  This is an issue that 
is rarely analyzed in the theoretical literature. To our knowledge the only exception is Tressel 
(2003), whose model analyses the emergence of banks after a first stage of development where 
the economy is endowed with an informal credit market. However, his analysis does not include 
the role of the credit  market  imperfection.  In our model,  credit  market  imperfection (judicial 
inefficency) is defined as in Matsuyama (2000, 2004) in relation to an enforcement problem: the 
borrowers  are  willing  to  honor their  payment  obligations  vis-à-vis  the bank only if  they are 
inferior to the cost of default. This cost of default increases with the judicial inefficiency. Also, 
contrary to Tressel (2003), in our model  the economy develops due to self-financed projects 
before the emergence of the banking system. This model shows that the banking system emerges 
once  the  economy  reaches  a  particular  stage  of  development.  The  higher  the  credit  market 
imperfection (judicial inefficiency) the later this emergence occurs. 
1 The countries are presented in table 1 of the Appendix.
2 The countries are presented in the table 2 of the Appendix.
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The second issue concerns the evolution of the effect of banking on growth when the credit 
market  is imperfect.  It  is related to the theoretical  studies analyzing the relationship between 
financial  development  and  economic  growth  which  began  with  Gurley  and  Shaw  (1955), 
Goldsmith (1969) and McKinnon (1973). After the emergence of the endogenous growth theory 
more convincing models were constructed (Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990; Bencivenga and 
Smith,  1993; Boyd and Smith,  1996; Blackburn and Hung, 1998).   Their common approach 
consists in the integration of a micro-economic model of financial contract theory in a dynamics 
general equilibrium model. These studies demonstrate the importance of financial development 
for  economic  growth.  However,  few theoretical  models  were developed to explain  the weak 
impact of the banking system on growth in many countries where although a modern banking 
system  has  always  emerged,  it  is  far  from  playing  its  role  in  enhancing  economic  growth 
(Demetriades and Hussein, 1996).  Nabi and Suliman (2009) showed that the intensity of causal  
effect from banking to economic growth is higher when the institutional environment improves. 
This is due to the reduction in the defaulting loans and the diminishing of the interest rate spread. 
In this paper we propose a model which explains the countries'  discrepancies in terms of the 
banking effect on economic growth by their different credit market imperfections’ levels. Indeed, 
its shows that after  the banking emergence,  the economy develops more quickly but remains 
under its growth potential  level along a second stage of development.  This is due to a credit 
rationing  brake  caused  by  the  credit  market  imperfection.  This  credit  rationing  loosens 
progressively as the economy develops and disappears in the third stage of development. The 
lower  the  credit  market  imperfection  is  the  faster  the  economy  reaches  the  third  stage  of 
development.  Hence,  the removal  of credit  market  imperfection should be a part  of financial 
reforms since it increases the enforceability of credit contracts and reduces the credit rationing 
phase. 
To  simplify  the  analysis,  this  work considers  identical  agents  who  can  be  borrowers 
(entrepreneurs  of  modern  projects)  or  depositors.  In  previous  studies,  they correspond to the 
"potentially dishonest" individuals of Jaffee and Russel (1976) who default only if it is in their 
interest to do so. The first stage of development is characterized by the undertaking of "primitive" 
projects. These projects are self-financed and less productive than the modern projects which 
need an indivisible investment superior to the agents' wealth. Hence, for the modern projects to 
be undertaken, entrepreneurs need to borrow from banks when they exist. The emergence of a 
banking system is related to its ability to attract depositors with the alternative to invest their  
wealth  in  primitive  projects.  This  is  the  case  if  the  interest  rate  is  superior  to  the  return  of 
"primitive" projects. 
After the emergence of the banking sector which is assumed to be perfectly competitive and 
having no operational or entry cost, the interest rate is endogenously determined by the interplay 
between the supply and demand of capital.  However, in the second stage of development, the 
potential of entrepreneurs to default sets the pace for a banking behavior that enforces the credit 
contract by fixing an interest rate ceiling. In this stage, all agents request bank loans but only a 
proportion effectively receive them. The remainder one is credit rationed and become depositors. 
The interest rate ceiling deprives the economy of additional saving capital that would finance 
more  modern  projects:  the  economy  grows  below  its  potential.  In  the  third  stage  of  the 
development,  there is  no need for the banking sector  to fix an interest  rate ceiling  since the 
entrepreneurs’ own capital invested in the modern project is so important that the cost of default 
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is higher than the payment obligations. The competitiveness between agents to get a loan raises 
the interest  rate to a threshold that makes  them indifferent  between undertaking a  project or 
depositing their wealth in the bank: there is no credit rationing and the economy grows without 
any break. 
Two main economic insights come out of this analysis. Firstly, the economy may be trapped in 
the first phase unless the "primitive" projects are sufficiently productive. Secondly,  the higher 
credit market imperfection is, the later the emergence of a banking system and the exit from the 
credit  rationing  stage  will  happen.  The  rest  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows:  Section  2 
develops the theoretical model. Section 3 exposes some concluding remarks.
2. Endogenous growth model
The basic framework is Diamond (1965) overlapping generations. The model integrates some 
features of Matsuyama (2000, 2004) namely the modelling of credit market imperfection and the 
indivisibility of the investment projects. However, it is different from it in many aspects. First, we 
use an endogenous growth specification of the capital accumulation technology, and second we 
include a banking system that emerges endogenously. Finally, while saving is not considered in 
Matsuyama (2000, 2004), in our model it plays  an important role in the dynamics of capital  
accumulation.
2.1 Economic environment
We consider a closed economy with an infinite, discrete time horizon, t= 0, 1, 2,… The economy 
is endowed with two production technologies; one for the production of a consumption (final) 
good and another  one for  the production of an investment  good.  The final  good is  used for 
consumption and for the production of the investment good. The investment good, in turn, is used 
as an input (in addition to labor) in the final good production technology.  It could be produced 
by  two  types  of  projects  ("primitive"  projects  or  modern  ones)  which  are  undertaken  by 
individual entrepreneurs of different   generations. Indeed, at each date a new generation of two-
period living and identical agents of mass 1 is born. An initial generation of old agents coexists 
with young agents at date t = 0. All agents are endowed with one unit of labor during their first-
period  of  life.  They  supply  it  to  the  final  good  sector  inelastically  at  no  disutility  cost. 
In  compensation  for  their  work,  they  earn  a  wage that  they  split  between  consumption  and 
saving/investment  in  order  to  maximize  their  intertemporal  utility.  For  agents  becoming 
entrepreneurs, the investment part will finance totally (respectively partially) the undertaking of 
“primitive” (respectively modern projects). After the emergence of a baking system, some agents 
will simply deposit their saving in a bank. 
2.1 Production technologies
Consumption good technology
The  consumption  (final)  good  is  obtained  instantaneously  from  the  combination  of  two 
substitutable factors: capital (good)  and labor . The technology which is assumed to be of 
Cobb-Douglas  type  exhibits  constant  returns  to  factors  but  includes  an  aggregate  level  of 
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"knowledge"   which  enables  the  endogenous  growth  of  the  aggregate  production: 
. We associate   to the aggregate stock of capital . This 
choice enables the endogenous growth of the aggregate production. Hence, the per capita output 
is given by αttt kAy = . Finally, capital depreciates fully after production and the factors' prices of 
capital and labor, respectively    and  , are equal to their marginal productivities: 
Therefore, a share  of the output is distributed to the workers (via wages  with   by 
assumption).  Whereas  a  share of  the  output  is  distributed  to  the  entrepreneurs  (via  the 
remuneration of capital ).  In the equilibrium the aggregate stock of capital is also the capital 
stock per capita: tt kk = . Hence, we obtain  
(1)
(2)
Note that the price of the capital is constant and this will simplify the financial structure of the 
model. Since each generation contains a mass 1 of identical agents, the aggregate wage of young 
agents is  . It also represents the aggregate wealth of the young agents which finances their 
consumption and their saving or investment projects (depending on their occupational choice). 
For simplification, in the remaining of the paper we call  the economy wealth. 
Investment good technology
The investment good (capital) is obtained from a one-period conversion of the final good through 
two possible technologies. The first is a primitive technology that converts linearly any quantity 
of the final good to  units of the investment good. The second is a modern technology which 
is more productive ( ) but requires a fixed initial quantity 3  of the final good to produce 
 units of the investment good. In the two cases, each produced unit of the investment good is 
sold to the final good sector at the price  in terms of the final good. Hence, an agent who 
undertakes a primitive project will obtain  units of the final good from an initial investment 
of quantity . Whereas after undertaking a modern project, an agent will obtain  units of the 
final good from an initial investment of . Therefore, the gross return of the modern technology 
is   whereas that of the primitive technology is  .  In order for these technologies to be 
profitable we should assume that . 
3 A similar assumption is considered in Aghion and Bolton (1997).  MacKinnon (1973) notes the importance of 
indivisible investment for the emerging countries.
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2.3 Banks
Banks exist to assist young agents in starting a modern project. Therefore, it shall be assumed 
that the individual wealth of each young agent at date t=0 denoted   is not high enough for the 
agents to self-finance a modern project.
Assumption   1 
Thus, in the region , the young agent's wage is inferior to the amount   required for the 
setting-up of the modern investment project. Hence, if he does not consume during its first period 
of life, the agent needs to borrow  from the bank. The banking system is assumed to be 
perfectly competitive but it faces a moral risk due to the imperfection of the credit market. An 
entrepreneur who wishes to set-up a modern investment project asks for a bank loan of 
where   represents its own capital. Having obtained this loan, the entrepreneur has an incentive 
to default  whenever  its  utility  is  increased by doing so.  Jaffee and Russel (1976) consider  a 
similar behavior for their "dishonest" borrowers. In their model, there is asymmetric information 
about the likelihood of default between lenders and borrowers and the default may actually occur. 
However,  in our model  the borrowers  (entrepreneurs)  are  of the same type,  the bank knows 
perfectly what incentives make them default and acts to deter this potentiality. The cost of default 
for a borrower is  where  is the modern project output and is the fraction that 
the bank can potentially seize. It is clear that for equal to one there is no incentive to default 
since the bank seizes all the modern project output. As in Matsuyama (2000), the parameter   is 
a structural  characteristic  of the economy which measures  the credit  market  imperfection.  In 
Barro (2000) the credit market imperfection reflects among others the weakness of the judicial 
institutions.  For  ,  the  bank   must  ensure  that  the  default  costs  less  than the  loan 
repayment.
Let us specify how the bank guarantees the borrowers' solvency. An entrepreneur who contracted 
a loan of  has to repay the bank   where  is the gross interest rate during 
period .  He is willing to do so if this repayment is less than the default cost  (in terms 
of the final good) 
(3)
Under the assumption that the banking system is perfectly competitive (which implies that the 
bank's profit is zero), the bank is willing to remunerate the deposits at the gross interest rate  if 
and only if the enforcement condition (3) holds for period  .  Finally,  it  is clear that the 
banking  emergence  is  conditioned  by  the  attractiveness  of  deposits  compared  to  primitive 
projects. In other words, banks exist if and only if the deposit remuneration is superior to the 
return of the primitive project.
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2.4 Agents
Each agent inelastically supplies one unit of labor during his first period of life. Therefore, the 
total labor supply (for the final good sector) at each date is . An agent of generation t (born 
at date ) earns a wage  at date   and uses it in order to maximize the homothetic utility 
 defined over his consumption in the two-period living
(4)
under the budget constraint that depends on his occupation during period  .
Depositors
The depositor consumes   and saves  in the bank in return of the gross deposit interest rate 
. Hence, the budget constraint is the following
The saving that maximizes the agent's utility is a constant fraction of its wage and is given by
(5)
The maximum utility   of the depositor can therefore be derived and we obtain
(6)
Modern entrepreneur
An agent who undertakes a modern project has to determine how to finance it optimally.  He 
should determine his self-financing  and the loan  taking in account his utility and 
the following budget constraint
(7)
The second equation explains that the entrepreneur's consumption at the second period is equal to 
the  modern  project  output  (in  term of  the  final  good)  net  of  the  debt  repayment.  The  self-
financing that maximizes the agent's utility is given by 
(8)
We observe in equation (8) that an increase of the capital cost increases the self-financing which 
is carried out by a decrease of the first period consumption. The maximum utility   of this 
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agent is given by
(9)
Primitive entrepreneur
An agent  who undertakes  a  primitive  project  does  not  need a  bank loan.  He should  simply 
determine   the  amount  to  invest  that  maximizes  his  utility  under  the  following  budget 
constraint
(10)
We obtain 
(11)
The maximum utility   of this agent can therefore be derived
Occupational choices
In this subsection, we analyze the agent's decision to become either a primitive entrepreneur or a 
saver, and then to become a modern entrepreneur or a depositor.
Proposition 1
• The agents prefer to become a depositor rather than a primitive entrepreneur if the  
interest rate is greater than the return of the primitive project 
(12)
• The agents prefer to become a modern entrepreneur rather than a depositor if the  
interest rate is lower than the return of the modern project 
(13)
Proof. The agents prefer the occupation that secures the highest utility. Hence, the proof follows 
straightforwardly from the comparison between the maximum utility (previously determined) that 
the agent can obtain from each occupation 
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2.5 Credit Market Equilibrium
First let us analyze the interaction between the enforcement condition (3) and the profitability 
condition (13).
Enforcement vis-à-vis Profitability Dominance
Definition  1  
We say that condition A dominates condition B if the fulfilling of A implies that B is fulfilled.
Proposition  2  
Let’s define   then we have
 
• The  enforcement  condition  (3)  dominates  the  profitability  condition  (13)  if 
. 
• The  profitability  condition  (13)  dominates  the  enforcement  condition  (3)  if 
. 
Proof. Replacing   by its expression (8), the enforcement condition (3) becomes
(14)
The rest of the proof is developed in the Appendix   From equation (14) that we shall assume 
that  the  credit  market  imperfection  measured  by   is  inferior  to    (the  utility  partial 
elasticity to the second period consumption). Otherwise, the right term of (14) is negative which 
implies  that  the  enforcement  condition  is  never  satisfied  and that  the  banking  system never 
emerges.
Assumption  2  
As can be seen from figure 3, in region  any interest rate level that fulfills the enforcement 
condition  satisfies  also  the  profitability  condition.  However,  when  the  economy  reaches  an 
advanced stage of development (the wealth level more than or equal to  ), the profitability 
condition  dominates  the enforcement  one.   In the wealth  interval ,  the entrepreneur's 
contribution to the project financing is not sufficiently high to guarantee the debt repayment.  
Even if  the project is  profitable  the entrepreneur may increase its  final wealth by defaulting. 
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Hence,  there  is  a  need  for  the  enforcement  condition.  However,  this  moral  hazard  problem 
disappears in the interval   where the entrepreneur's contribution is sufficiently high that 
the incentive to default disappears.
Interest  Rate and Development Regions  
Let’s  denotes the wealth threshold which marks the banking emergence.
Corollary  1  
• At the equilibrium of the credit market the interest rate is   given by
(15)
• The wealth interval    is characterized by credit rationing.
• The  wealth  interval   is  characterized  by  the  agents’  indifference  between 
becoming depositors or modern entrepreneurs.
Proof.  Let's consider that the wealth of the economy has reached the threshold  so that the 
banking system has emerged. From proposition 1 it is clear that unless the interest rate is equal or  
superior to the modern project return , all young agents prefer to become modern entrepreneurs 
rather than depositors. However, since the loanable funds arise from the young agent saving, it is 
obvious that only a proportion of them can effectively undertake a modern project. Hence, as far 
as the interest rate is less than the modern project return, the agents will compete with each other  
to obtain a loan. This competition increases the interest rate. When the wealth of the economy is 
less than  , proposition 2 describes that banks limit  the gross interest  rate to the threshold 
 in order to exclude the default possibility. Hence, the credit market equilibrium in the 
interval  is such that the gross interest rate is equal to the maximum level . 
This level is lower than the gross return of modern projects . Therefore, at the equilibrium, all 
agents  prefer  becoming  modern  entrepreneurs  (proposition  1).  However,  as  we  explained 
previously only a proportion of the agents become entrepreneurs. The remainder proportion is 
credit rationed and become depositors. When the economy wealth exceeds  , proposition 2 
proves that the profitability of the modern project in comparison to the bank deposit guarantees 
the debt repayment. Hence, the only restriction to the interest rate is the profitability condition. 
Therefore, the agent competitiveness raises the gross interest rate to the threshold   which is 
reached at the equilibrium. At this interest rate level the modern project yields the same return as 
the deposit contract. Thus, the agents do not compete to obtain a loan; they are indifferent to the 
decision of becoming depositors or entrepreneurs 
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We call the wealth interval  the credit rationing region. Figure 4 plots the evolution of 
the gross interest rate with the economy wealth.
2.6  The Banking Emergence and Dynamics of capital accumulation
The banking emergence is conditioned by the attractiveness of deposits compared to primitive 
projects. Indeed, banks exist if they are able to transform the saving of depositors to loans for the 
modern entrepreneurs. In order to collect the young agents' saving the remuneration of deposits 
should be superior to the primitive project return:  .
Corollary 2
The banking system emerges when the wealth of the economy reaches the threshold   defined 
by
(16)
Proof. Using  the  gross  interest  rate  expression  (15),  the  threshold   is  defined  by 
 which gives the equation (16). Using the fact that a > m and assumption 2, it 
is easy to show that  When the wealth of the economy is smaller than  wm   the only 
available occupation for the young agents during their second period of life is the undertaking of 
primitive projects. We classify the economy in the region   as a primitive economy.
Corollary 3
After  the  emergence  of  the  banking  system  (  )  the  proportion   of  modern 
entrepreneurs is given by
(17)
Proof. After the emergence of the banking system, the proportion   of modern entrepreneurs 
(and therefore  the  proportion    of  depositors)  is  determined  by the  equality  between 
deposits and loans (since the banking system is perfectly competitive and the bank's profit is nil).  
Denoting  the  saving  of  a  depositor  at  the  equilibrium  of  the  credit  market  and   the 
contribution of a modern entrepreneur to the financing of the project, the proportion    is given 
by
which implies 
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Using the equations (5) and (8) that define    and  we find the solution (17) 
Note that for a given  the wealth of the economy , the proportion of entrepreneurs increases 
with the interest rate  .  To explain the reason behind this increase, we should take 
into consideration that the saving of a rationed agent is  and that the self-financing of an 
entrepreneur increases with the interest rate. Therefore, the financing need for an entrepreneur 
decreases  which  raises  the  proportion  of  financed  projects  (8).  The  dynamics  of  wealth 
accumulation depends on the quantity of investment good produced. From equation (2) we see 
that the economy wealth at the end of period  is given by . Besides, the 
capital accumulation level   is equal to the proportion of undertaken projects multiplied by 
the  production  of  each  one.  Before  the  banking  emergence,  each  young  agent  undertakes  a 
primitive  project  which  transforms    final  good to    capital  good.  Therefore,  in  the 
primitive region of development   the dynamics  of wealth accumulation is given by
. When banks emerge, the capital accumulation level becomes equal to 
the proportion of modern projects  multiplied by the production   of each one. Hence, the 
dynamics of wealth accumulation in the region is given by  . 
Using the expression (11) of   and (17) of   we obtain the following wealth dynamics:
(18)
Corollary   4 
• If  the  productivity  of  primitive  projects  is  superior  to  the  threshold 
 then the economy grows and exits the primitive region . 
Otherwise, it never develops.
• After the banking emergence, the economy grows less than its potential in the region 
of credit rationing .
Proof. The  economy  grows  before  of  the  emergence  of  banking  if  and  only  if 
 which  is  equivalent  using  (11)  and  (2)  to .  Hence,  the 
condition for the growth in the primitive region is  that the productivity of primitive projects 
exceeds the threshold . After the emergence of banking, the dynamics of capital 
accumulation is given by    which is given using the expression (17) of  :
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Hence, we obtain the gross growth level
It  is  clear  that  the  higher  the  interest  rate  is  the  higher  the  economic  growth  will  be 
. Therefore, proving that the economy grows below its potential growth in the 
region of credit rationing is equivalent to proving that the interest rate would be higher without 
credit  rationing.  This  is  immediately  noticed  as  the  credit  rationing  results  provokes  banks 
intervention  to  enforce  the entrepreneur's  repayment.  Without  the enforcement  condition,  the 
competitiveness between young agents raises the interest rate to the level    which is superior 
to  in the region .  Figure 5 shows the dynamics of wealth accumulation when the 
productivity of primitive projects is sufficiently high   to enable the economy to exit the 
primitive region .
2.7 Impact of the Credit Market Imperfection
Impact on the Development Regions and the Interest Rate
Proposition  3   
If the credit market imperfection decreases then the emergence of banking and the exit from the 
credit rationing region are accelerated. Besides, the interest rate increases in the initial region of 
credit rationing.
 
Proof. See Appendix 
This result is depicted by figure 6 for an economy with a credit market imperfection that passes 
from   to  .  Why do  the  wealth  threshold    which  marks  the 
banking  emergence  decrease  with  the  credit  market  imperfection  (i.e.  when    increases)? 
Assume that the initial credit market imperfection is  . Therefore, banking emerges when 
the  economy  wealth  reaches  or  equivalently  when  the  young  agents'  potential  self-
financing of the modern project reaches the minimum threshold . Let’s now assume that 
credit market imperfection decreases and passes to . In this case, banks can seize a greater 
fraction of the output produced by a defaulting entrepreneur. As a result, the constraint on interest 
rate  imposed  by  the  enforcement  condition  is  loosened.  Or  equivalently  the  minimum 
contribution  to  the  modern  project  financing  is  lowered to  .  Consequently,  banking 
emerges when the economy wealth reaches   < .
The  same  reasoning  enables  us  to  explain  why  the  exit  from the  credit  rationing  region  is 
accelerated.  Indeed, initially  the enforcement  condition dominates  the profitability one in the 
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region .  However,  the  default  cost  in  this  region  becomes  higher  than  the  debt 
repayment  after  the  decrease  of  the  credit  market  imperfection.  This  dissuades  modern 
entrepreneurs to default. As a result, there is no more need for the enforcement condition in this  
region where the only constraint to the interest rate becomes the profitability condition. At the 
credit market equilibrium, the latter is saturated and young agents are indifferent to the depositing 
occupation as well as the modern entrepreneurial condition.
Impact on the capital accumulation dynamic  s  
 Proposition 4  
A decrease of the credit market imperfection accelerates the economy's dynamics through an 
earlier emergence of the banking system and an increase of the modern project proportion in  
the initial region of credit rationing.
Proof. Let's consider that the credit  market  imperfection decreases from   to  . 
According to proposition 3, the wealth threshold that marks the banking emergence passes from 
 to  .  As  a  consequence  of  the  earlier  banking  emergence,  a 
proportion of the young agents can undertake a modern project even when the economy wealth 
belongs to the interval . Initially, the only option available to young agents in 
this region was the setting-up of primitive projects. Since, modern projects are more productive 
than  primitive  ones,  it  is  clear  that  the  earlier  banking  emergence  accelerates  the  wealth 
accumulation dynamics. The second source that accelerates this dynamics is the increasing of the 
modern projects proportion in the initial region of credit rationing . Indeed, using 
expression (17) and proposition 3 we observe that the proportion of modern projects increases 
when the credit market imperfection decreases (  increases): 

This finding can be explained as mentioned hereafter. When the interest rate increases a modern 
entrepreneur  becomes  willing  to  decrease  his  first  period  consumption  and  to  increase  his 
contribution to the project financing ( ) in order to maximize its intertemporal utility. 
Meanwhile,  the depositor increases his  utility by decreasing his first-period consumption and 
increasing his saving ( ). Therefore, banks collect more savings and finance more 
projects  since  the  project  external  financing  decreases.  Figure  7  illustrates  the  effect  of  a 
diminution in the credit market imperfection on the wealth accumulation dynamics.
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Conclusion
In this paper we presented a model of development that links capital accumulation to the extent 
of capital market imperfection, and which yields a number of new insights. Indeed, in a simple 
endogenous growth model, the development process seems to be composed by three stages. In 
the first stage, the banking system does not exist and the economy develops slowly due to a 
primitive technology of capital accumulation. The second stage marks the emergence of banking 
and the substitution of the primitive technology by a more productive modern technology which 
enhances growth. But this paper has shown that the credit market imperfection creates a potential 
incentive for bank's borrower to default. This sets the place for a banking intervention to fix an 
interest rate ceiling in order to enforce the debt repayment. However, this intervention generates a 
situation  of  credit  rationing which  prevents  the  economy from reaching its  potential  growth. 
Finally in the third stage, the credit rationing constraint on growth disappears. These findings 
match the stylized facts reported in the introduction. Namely,  the persistence of credit market 
imperfection  (judicial  inefficiency)  in  many  developing  countries  could  be  a  factor  that  has 
prevented the banking system from fully playing its enhancing economic growth role.
Appendix
Proof of proposition 2
The profitability condition (13) and the enforcement condition (3) are given by
Let's denote   the wealth level such that
Therefore,    is equal to .  Hence,
(19)
(20)
Using the "dominance" definition, (19) and (20) imply that the enforcement condition dominates 
the profitability condition in   and the opposite is true in the wealth interval . 
Proof of proposition 3
Let's assume that the credit market imperfection decreases and passes from to  . 
From corollary 2 it follows that the economy wealth threshold that marks the banking emergence 
decreases and passes from   to  defined by
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It is clear that   which implies that the decrease of the credit market imperfection 
accelerates the banking emergence. From corollary 1, it follows that the threshold that marks the 
exit from the credit rationing region passes from   to  . 
Hence,  the  exit  from the  credit  rationing  region is  accelerated.  Again,  from corollary 1,  we 
conclude that the interest rate passes from to   when the economy wealth is   and we 
have for  . 
(21)
It follows that    is superior to   in the initial region of credit rationing .
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Figure 1. Financial Depth and Judicial Efficiency for 76 countries per quartile over 2000-2004
Source: The authors' calculus based on Laeven and Majnoni (2005) and Beck et al. (rev. 2006)
Figure 2. Entrepreneurship density and Judicial Efficiency
Source: The authors' calculus based on Laeven and Majnoni (2005)  and World Bank Group Entrepreneurship Database (2007)
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Figure 3. The frontiers of the enforcement and profitability conditions
Figure 4. The equilibrium gross interest rate
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Figure 5. The dynamics of wealth accumulation
Figure 6. Impact of the credit market imperfection on the interest rate and the development regions
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Figure 7. Impact of the credit market imperfection on the dynamics of wealth accumulation
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Table 1. Country list according to their "level" of judicial efficiency
Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
Haiti Gabon Zambia Thailand
Albania Madagascar El Salvador Republic of Korea
Bangladesh Panama Malaysia Trinidad & Tob
Cameroon Peru Uruguay Namibia
Colombia Russia Slovak Republic Sweden
Zimbabwe Sri Lanka Gambia Chile
Mozambique Jamaica Latvia Hong Kong
Nigeria China Moldova Kuwait
Brazil Croatia Oman Japan
Guatemala Ethiopia Tanzania Australia
Honduras Bulgaria Botswana Canada
Indonesia Costa Rica Estonia Denmark
Kenya Egypt Jordan Iceland
Mexico Guyana Poland New Zealand
Vietnam Lithuania Morocco Norway
Dominican Republic Malawi Argentina Singapore
Armenia Mongolia Czech Republic Switzerland
Bolivia Uganda Israel United Kingdom
Ecuador Venezuela Slovenia United States
Table 2. Country List according to their "level" of GDP per capita
Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
Madagascar El Salvador Poland Finland
Zambia Peru Slovak Republic Sweden
Kenya Ukraine Czech Republic France
Haiti Colombia Malta United Kingdom
Moldova Russia Slovenia Belgium
Germany Costa Rica Greece Canada
Bangladesh South Africa Portugal Australia
Bolivia Botswana Cyprus Austria
Indonesia Latvia New Zealand Denmark
Sri Lanka Chile Israel Iceland
Morocco Croatia Spain Netherlands
Albania Lithuania Japan Switzerland
Jordan Estonia Italy Ireland
Lebanon Argentina Hong Kong United States
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